“Crack the Sky, Shake the Earth” — Message to communist forces who were informed that they were “about to inaugurate the greatest battle in the history of our country”.

Whether by accident or design, the first wave of attacks began shortly after midnight on 30 January as all five provincial capitals in II Corps and Da Nang, in I Corps, were attacked.  Nha Trang, headquarters of the U.S. I Field Force, was the first to be hit, followed shortly by Ban Me Thuot, Kontum, Hoi An, Tuy Hoa, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Pleiku.  During all of these operations, the communists followed a similar pattern: mortar or rocket attacks were closely followed by massed ground assaults conducted by battalion-strength elements of the Viet Cong, sometimes supported by North Vietnamese regulars.  These forces would join with local cadres who served as guides to lead the regulars to the most senior South Vietnamese headquarters and the radio station.  The operations, however, were not well coordinated at the local level.  By daylight, almost all communist forces had been driven from their objectives.  General Phillip B. Davidson, the new MACV chief of intelligence, notified Westmoreland that “This is going to happen in the rest of the country tonight and tomorrow morning.”  All U.S. forces were placed on maximum alert and similar orders were issued to all ARVN units. The allies, however, still responded without any real sense of urgency. Orders cancelling leaves either came too late or were disregarded.

At 03:00 on the morning of 31 January communist forces assailed Saigon, Cholon, and Gia Dinh in the Capital Military District; Quảng Trị (again), Huế, Quang Tin, Tam Kỳ, and Quảng Ngãi as well as U.S. bases at Phú Bài and Chu Lai in I Corps; Phan Thiết, Tuy Hòa, and U.S. installations at Bong Son and An Khê in II Corps; and Cần Thơ and Vinh Long in IV Corps.  The following day, Biên Hòa, Long Thanh, Bình Dương in III Corps and Kien Hoa, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Kien Giang, Vinh Binh, Bến Tre, and Kien Tuong in IV Corps were assaulted.  The last attack of the initial operation was launched against Bac Lieu in IV Corps on 10 February. A total of approximately 84,000 communist troops participated in the attacks while thousands of others stood by to act as reinforcements or as blocking forces.  Communist forces also mortared or rocketed every major allied airfield and attacked 64 district capitals and scores of smaller towns.

In most cases the defense against the communists was a South Vietnamese affair.  Local militia or ARVN forces, supported by the National Police, usually drove the attackers out within two or three days, sometimes within hours; but heavy fighting continued several days longer in Kontum, Buôn Ma Thuột, Phan Thiết, Cần Thơ, and Bến Tre.  The outcome in each instance was usually dictated by the ability of local commanders—some were outstanding, others were cowardly or incompetent.  During this crucial crisis, however, no South Vietnamese unit broke or defected to the communists.

According to Westmoreland, he responded to the news of the attacks with optimism, both in media presentations and in his reports to Washington.  According to closer observers, however, the general was “stunned that the communists had been able to coordinate so many attacks in such secrecy” and he was “dispirited and deeply shaken.”  According to Clark Clifford, at the time of the initial attacks, the reaction of the U.S. military leadership “approached panic”.  Although Westmoreland’s appraisal of the military situation was correct, he made himself look foolish by continuously maintaining his belief that Khe Sanh was the real objective of the communists and that 155 attacks by 84,000 troops was a diversion (a position he maintained until at least 12 February).  Washington Post reporter Peter Braestrup summed up the feelings of his colleagues by asking “How could any effort against Saigon, especially downtown Saigon, be a diversion?”

SOURCE: Wikipedia

Next – Saigon

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